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Introduction 
A new peak labor organization， the Japanese Trade Union Con-
2 fたe吋俄耐d命e貯r伽n叫仰仰仰~go (リJapa拙 e蜘 e例V吋巾樹叫i均凶凶a抗tio加n)併m附的1リwas fou江I耐 d
宍 2却0，1悶98肝7. Rengo began as a national organization for the private 
Q sector-On November 21，1989Rengo absorbed Sohyo，the cor巾 dra-
tion which had mainly organized the public sector， thereby unifying 
the public and private sector unions under one large organization. 
The new Rengo nO¥v embraced 78 industrial federations and approxi-
mately 8 million members， a figure which equals 65% of the organized 
labor， 17% of J apan's total employees and 9% of the nation's voters. 
The 78 federations contain some 12，000 enterprise unions. Therefore， 
Reηgo is a confederation of confederations. However， Rengo has no 
formal authority or de facto power over the enterprise unions that 
are its members. 
This organizational structure appears contradictory and confus田
ing at first glance. Questions that come to mind are: 1s Rengo strong 
or not? To what extent has Rengo succeeded in integrating its more 
than 12，000 member unions? How does Rengo acquire effective 
bargaining power against business interests and the government? 
Many foreign observers， including Chalmers Johnson have noted 
that enterprise unions tend to be co-opted by company's managerial 
logic and that employers' control over personnel affairs easily pene-
trates enterprise unions. Consequently，“organized labor has no role 
or voice in politics" (Johnson， 1989， p.119). Therefore， ithas been 
argued that Rengo， which is just one node within a dual confedera-
tion， isa weak， poor and vulnerable national center. Leftist critics in 
Japan even use the phrases “rightist reorganization and cooperative 
with capital and goverrment" to describe the character of the confe-
dration. 
Certain factors make the argument regarding the weakness of 五
八
Rengo appear plausible. There is visibly poor density of the budget 尖
and sta妊incentralization. Only 2.5 billion yen out of 600 bilIion yen 
in the whole labor union's budget is spent on the sta仔members(100 
out of 20，000 total sta妊)and other activities. Rengo seems organ-
izationally weaker than even So~ぴo. From the perspective， there 
seems no reason to believe that it is influential in the political field. 
Despite of the relative scarcity of its resources， success of Rengo 
has been remarkable. First， ithas achieved strong hegemony very 
rapidly within the labor movement. Second， itseems to play an 
important part in highlighting labor issues and strengthening labor's 
position in the policy making process. Third， Rengo or its predeces-
sors， has achieved favorable policy outputs such as tax reductions， 
several employment security laws made between 1977-87， the Equal 
Opportunity Law (1985)， the Stabilization of Senior W orkers Employ-
ment Law (1986) and so on.1 Lastly， italso demonstrated significant 
potential to influence the electoral process during the 1989 Councillor' 
s Election. Therefore， my first question is， why are/were Rengo and 
its core members， which consists of ten core industrial federations 
that initiated the formation of Rengo， strong? 
I . Theoretical Puzzle in Japan : 
My question about the strength of Rengo is linked to a broader 
theoretical puzzle in ]apanese politics which is actively debated upon 
in the academic world. Particularly， since the emergence of the 
pluralist school in the late 1970s， the study of the political model of 
2 Jap伊阿a釘I凶 a部sbeen a山 eaof a g陀rea抗td酌泌引凸ir蹴 r陀附e田s叫 pr仙的ean 
;尖ミ sometimes confusing works (see: Allison， 1989. Tsujinaka， 1994). 
1 See Muramatsu et al (1986)， based on 1980 interest groups survey， and 
1989 survey of !abor po]icy network done by Je妊reyBroadbent and 
Yutaka Tsujinaka (forthcoming) for a review of labor !eaders' satisfac-
tion with these laws. 
From the extensive literature available， at least four distinctive 
models of ]apanese politics can be discerned. These can be summar-
ized as: 1) the vertical /elitist or bureaucracy dominant model， 2)the 
horizontal or pluralist model， 3)the cultural or historical model and 
4) the corporatist model. A hard nut to crack for al these four 
models is the very question of how to resolve two apparently contra-
dictory phenomena that have been occuring since the 1960s， particu-
lar1y after the first oil shock. First striking phenomenon concerns the 
pluralization of political actors in ]apan such as the Diet， parties， 
Zoku (policy experts who are party politicians in relationship with 
bureaucrats and interest groups)， local governments， advisory coun-
cils and many interest groups including big companies. This plural-
ization ended in a crystalization of a new coalition goverment in 
Augugt 1933. But the second phenomenon is equally striking， namely 
]apan's good performance in crisis management and readjustment 
process， particularly during the world wide depression and socio-
economic transformation in the 1970s and the 1980s. 
The vertical model accords bureaucracies an important role in 
spite of recognizing some loss of bureaucratic authority.2 Pluralists 
have added various adjectives to the term pluralism such as“patter-
ned" ，“bureaucratic" ，“inclusive" ;“referent" or“compartmentalized" 
in an effort to interpret the contradiction between pluralization of 五_.. 
ノ、
actors and good social performance. There is however no credible 尖
mechanism to resolve. this puzzle. Instead most analysts in this ~ 
2 It incIudes the “tripartite elite" model developed by Fukuji Taguchi， 
Takeshi Ishida and others and the influential“developmental state 
model" by Chalmers Johnson (1982). 
school emphasized LDP leader's cleverness and their ability to gov-
ern.3 Culturalists have invented a lot of new key concepts like 
“corporativism" ，“contextualizm" ，“Ye" and “vertical human rela-
tionship叫 buttheir analysis remains impressionist and excessively 
abstract. This is especially true of the “starfish" model (N akane， 
1978) and the “cosmos" interpretation of politics (Kyogoku， 1983). In 
addition， these models have virtually ignored labor and the signifi-
cance of labor unions in their analysis. 
Only the corporatist model has seriously considered the relation-
ship between pluralizing political system and outstanding perfor-
mance. They have tried to locate the labor movement and labor 
unions within the socio・politicalsystem. In this literature， there is a 
wide range of arguments from “strong corporatist" to“corporatist 
without labor" to“corporative pluralist" (cf Tsujinaka， 1986 and 
Mochizuki， 1985). The corporatist argument requires that three 
conditions should be fulfilled; 1) an ideology of social partnership or 
social co・operation2) a relatively centralized and concentrated sys-
tem of interest groups， 3)voluntary and informal co-ordination of 
confticting objectives through continuous political bargaining 
between interest groups， the state， bureaucracies and political 
parties. (Katzenstein， 1985). Although ]apan did not until recently 
zf雌 1to the second condition concerning the centralization， condi-
_，_ 
ノ、
e 3 See the works by Michio Muramatsu， Seizaburo Sato， Takashi Ignochi 
and Ikuo Kabashima. AIso cf. works of economists in Japan such as 
Ryutaro Komiya. 
4 See the works by Eshun Hamaguchi， Yasusuke Murakami， Jun'ichi 
Kyogoku， Ronald Dore and Robert Smith. 
tions 1 and 3， seem to exist in Japan. Needless to say， the perfor-
mance of J apan has been very close to that of highly successful 
corporatist countries in Europe (Cameron 1984， Kume， 1988 and 
Katzenstein， 1985 & 1988). What， then substitutes for the the centrali-
zation among labor in J apan? 
In applying the concept of corporatism to Japan， some have 
conceded to reduced terms but emphasized culture and ideology 
instead (Schmidt 1983). Others have changed the focus to meso or 
micro level institutions (Dore 1988). Some have used a broader 
concept for corporatism， such as concertation (Harari 1986， Schwartz 
1990). Some used the hypothesis of democratic corporatism but 
avoided using this concept in Japan (Kume， 1988). 1 argue， along with 
Shimada (1984)， that there is a theoretical request to develop a 
functional equivalent of corporatist centralization of networks in 
Japan. 
My hypothesis is as follows; Rengo and its core members have 
become quite strong， (particularly， when compared to Sohyo)， because 
they have developed osmotic networks that function on not only intra 
sectoral basis (labor) but also intersectoral basis. They are linked to 
the government as well. Network prototypes can be found in private 
enterprise unions. The major characteristic is a permeable boundary 
伽 ughwJ帥 wi伽山f叫 ingon each union's autonomy， variety言
。fintra-and inter-sectoral behaviors could occur. For example，宍
special transfers， loans or exchange of personnel can happen， estab- 五
lishment of study groups can be taken， and a formal or informal 
consultation system can be established. The term“network" means 
netlike combinations of actors and units which are not necessarily 
based on legal or jurisdictional authorities. The links within these 
networks are relatively weak and soft， which is in sharp contrast to 
a hierarchal combination with one center of authority and distinct 
boundaries and formal relationships (Aoki， 1988， 1989). But出e
density of these osmotic networks can function as an equivalent to 
the centralization that is achieved by peak organizations in “corpor-
atist" countries， owing to the shared information and perspectives 
that they generate. 
But what accounts for the strength of Rengo? The reasons for this 
can be summarized as follows ; 
1) State and society in ]apan have become an osmotic network 
system. This parallel structuring supports the functioning of Rengo 
and its core members. 
2) Enterprise unions， the fundamental units of Rengo， have become 
crucial information mediators for companies owing to the transfor-
mation into network companies， both from inside and outside (Aoki， 
ibid， Imai， 1988). In the light， Rengo has become a node， as an 
enlarged version of an enterprise union， which can provide a place for 
nation-wide information exchange among innumerable enterprise 
unions. Therefore， Rengo can negotiate with other actors on the 
basis of the extensive and comprehensive information about the labor 
五 sectorthat it has access to. These functions have made Rengo a 
宍 crucialelement in the ]apanese socio・politicalsystem. 
???
In this paper， 1 would like to : 
i . describe the intra-and inter-sector networks that Rengo and its 
core members have developed ; 
i. analyze the behavioral effects they have created; 
ii. restate the differences between Rengo and Sohyo ; and 
iv. review the historical process and reasons for network develop. 
ment with special emphasis on the critical importance of the events 
in 1964. 
1. Networks of Rengo and its core Members 
1. Micro Enterprise level 
Rengo's core members consist of about 10 major private sector 
industrial federations5 which contain the major enterprise unions in 
J apan. As their strength comes principally from the enterprise unIons 
that are their constituent members， 1 will first describe the networks 
at the enterprise level. At this level the joint consultation body is as 
important as the labor union. This body was founded in the 1950's 
and it became significant in the 1960's in terms of the quality of 
information and importance in consultation issues (The Labor Year. 
book of Japan， 1987. pp.162-73). This body and the enterprise union 
are not incompatible but mutually supportive. ln 1984， 87.9% of 
companies with labor unions had the joint consultation bodies. ln 
contrast， only 40.9% of companies without unions had the joint 
consultation bodies. ln 60% of companies， consultations and negotia-
tions are inter.related or mixed. When requested by the union， 56% 五
of companies would provide even a certain classified information of 六
business through consultation. :!; 
5 Electronic， automobile， stel， ship.building， textile， electronic， power， 
chemical， commerce， metal， sailor and life insurance labor unions. (See 
table 5) 
There exists an intense， cooperative exchange of information in 
almost al private companies. This is true not only at company level， 
but also increasingly important at establishment and shop level 
particularly in institutionalized manufacturing industrial relations. 
In ]apan， the enterprise union is an indispensable partner of the 
employer who also includes some of former labor union executives. 
In enterprise unions， al union executives continue to stay as 
employees in the company. Even at the industrial federation level 
more than half of the executives in the ten biggest unions continue to 
keep their employee status in the companies (Rengo， 1989， p.49). In 
short， inthe Rengo core member unions， osmotic networks between 
business and labor are active and e妊ective.Aoki (1989， pp. 4-5) has 
suggested出atemployees as a group have become indespensible 
network specific assets， just as has created within horizontal informa-
tion networks in compani白.
2. Meso Industry level 
In order to gain stronger negotiating and bargaining powers， 
enterprise unions need adequate reference groups. Therefore， they 
have developed their networks not only within the specific sub-
industry but also in the sub-industries where related products are 
made. The absence of a centralized industrial union is compensated 
五 withinnumerable formal and semi-formal struggle-fronts and confer-
宍 ences.A part of them relating to the machinery industry is shown in 
/¥ :_; Figure 1. 
Enterprise union networks such as joint struggle fronts and infor-
mation exchange meetings can be classified as follows : 
1. Wage-struggle fronts Iike Tertiary Industry Struggle Front. 
??ー???
?
? ?
??。『??
? ? ?
?
• 
ゼンセン流通商業労組
Labor Union Network in the Machinery Industry Fig.l 
A 
???
?????
???A: Large industrial level organization 
B: Industrial federation affiliated to RENGO 
C: Sub-industry lev巴Iorganization 
D: Enterprise union (most of them are omitted) 
Source: Shinoda 1989b 
(法〉ト)0凶1I
Industrial poIicy organizations such as Round Table on Construc-2. 
tion Industry Policy and Labor Union Round Table on Information 
Industry PoIicy. 
Labor condition struggle fronts such as ]oint Struggle for Holi-
day on Saturdays. 
3. 
White collar employee occupational organizations such as Clerk 4. 
Union Conference of Commerce and Service Industry. 
Enlarged industrial confederations such as IMF-]C， Chemical and 5. 
Energic Labor Conference and Mic-Unions in the mass media . 
International industrial unions such as the branches of ITF-]CC， 
FIET-]LC. 
6. 
Political-ideological groups， for example， Round Table of United 7. 
Front of Labor Union. 
The others， for example， Labor Union Conference on Multi 8. 
National Corporations (Shinoda， 1989 b， pp. 122~23). 
Besides the osmotic networks， there are about 250 major indus司
(See table 1) They are formal consulting actors trial federations. 
Industrial with business associations and government ministries. 
management-labor conferences have spread since the late 1960s. 
According to a survey of federations a伍liatedwith Rengo， 30 federa-
tions meet with their business counterparts in the following forms : 
collective bargaining (1)， consultation (15)， negotiation (10) and the 
? ? ? ? ? ? ?
? others (8) (Rengo 1989 and Nihon Seisan-sei Honbu 1980). 
Macro Nation Level 3. 
Since the 1970s both labor and business/government have had to 
develop networks among themselves to share information and to 
cooperate. Before touching on some political aspects， we should note 
Table 1 Organizational Level of Labor Union Fed-
eration and Business Association in MITI 
related Sectors 
Large ~-ledium SmaIl Fine Large Medium 5ma!! Fine L<lrge Medium 5ma!! 
D Mining 4 14 59 5 1 
E ConstrLldion 3 20 47 8 5 1 
F Manufacl.ure 23 161 588 9 34 65 5 1 16 
G Public Utili 4 6 10 4 2 
H Tranl-;. Comuni 8 32 ん 55 7 8 24 8 2 
1 Commcrce 12 54 150 7 3 
J Finance 8 22 i2 4 5 23 
K Re.d Est~!te 2 b 9 
L 配 r¥'ices 25 113 221 3 21 
J'utaJ 14 96 452 1262 25 72 139 16 3 18 
JapaneSl' Standard Labor Union Business t¥ssociation 
CI日目ificationoi [nclu詰trv Net¥¥'りrk
Sourcε Zenkoku shuyo f{ndokumiai kh出川 (NatiunaLabor Unioo Dir町 tory)19RB 
Tsu続lH日hnKank明 KoekihojinIchiran (MITI related A&.'1odation Directoryl 19R~ 
じaluculatl:'db~' the iluthor 
34 
2 
36 
Fine 
8 
140 
1 
1 
157 
the continued existence of Shunto (Spring Wage Offensive) and its 
logic which started in the 1950s， was 0伍ciallyaccepted by the 
government in 1964 and has been firmly institutionalized since the 
first oil shock. Shimada (1983) showed that the negotiating abiIity of 
networks among labor， business and governmel1t isapproximately 
equivalent to that of a centralized peak orgal1ization (figure 2). 
Five economic or institutional networks lead to wage spil‘overin 
al corners (Nitta 1990， p.84). These are: 
1. Networks among big business based on inter-sectoral relations 四
l¥ 
and stable transaction relations， to check mutuaI labor costs. 毛
2. Networks between big business and sub幽contractorsbased on 
corporate group system and transaction， also to check mutuaI labor 
costs. 
3. Institutions to check labor costs in public or semi-public utilities 
Fig.2 Sunto Network of Information Exchange around 1980 
Union side 
Notes: 
C: 
U: 
1F: 
IU: 
8CC: 
? ? ? ? ? ? ?
IMF-JC: 
SJSC: 
CR: 
PM: 
恥lOF:
MOL: 
EPA: 
CUU: 
Government 
colpany or enterprise 
enterprise union 
industry federation of companies 
industry federation of enterprise unions 
eight~company conference of executives in charge of 
industrial relations 
International Metalworkers Federation-J apan Council 
Shunto Joint Struggl巴Council
Chi1ritsuroren (National Centre of Independent Unions) 
Prime Minister 
乱!finistryof Finance 
Ministry of Labour 
Economic Planning Agency 
Council for Unification of Unions. 
Source: Shimada 1983 
(transportation， electric power and telecommunications) set up by 
government based on the standard of private industry. 
4. Institutions to decide the wage raise in the public sector， based on 
the standard raise of private industry. 
5. Institutional practice to decide the wage raise in the non-profit 
sector， based on the public sectors wage raise_ 
After Rengo's core members have gained initiative since 1975， and 
particularly after Rengo was formed in 1987， the whole process has 
been adjusted as a systematic network. Before this year， the Shunto 
process， especially which industrial federation should perform the 
role of pattern setter， had been debated by competing blocs in the 
labor sector (see footnote 8). 
There are several nodes which knit together the networks of 
labor， business and government bureaucracies， e.g.， Sanrokon (Tripar-
tite Round Table Conference on Industry and Labor Issue) and other 
non-statutory advisory boards， Sankoshin (Advisory Council on Indus-
trial Structure) and other statutory advisory boards， Rengo-Ministry 
standing consultation bodies and temporary policy study groups. 
Sanrokon， which was established in 1970 and has been activated after 
the oil shock， consists of 12 labor representatives， 12business repre匂
sentatives and 6 neutral intellectuals and some bureaucrats， mostly 
from Labor and Economic Planning Agency. (Tsujinaka， 1986) 
??
As shown in Table 2， labor unions send 185 members (in 1993， 198 七
members) out of a total of about 4000 members and are represented 
in sixty three out of a total of 214 advisory boards in 1988. They have 
no members in the advisory boards of the Ministries of Justice， 
Foreign Affairs and Education and in the policy fields of statistics， 
Advisory Board Members by Social 
Groups: A Comparison of 1973 and 1988 in 
Japan 
Table 2 
1973 1988 Margin 1988-1973 
Labor Rengo (]TUC) 25 27 2 
Rengokei (affiliation to ]TUC) 34 69 35 
Others 27 33 6 
Sohyo (GCTU) 29 39 10 
Sohyokei (a任iliationto GCTU) 46 17 -29 
Labor Total 161 185 24 
Business Keidanren (FEO) 41 31 -10 
Center Nikkeiren (JFEA) 10 10 。
Nissyo (JCCI) 20 14 -6 
Doyukai UCED) 2 :J 3 
Kankeiren (Kan日aiFEO) 3 7 4 
Tosyo (Tokyo CCI) 9 7 -2 
Daisyo (Osaka CCI) 6 4 -2 
Other CCIs 14 6 -8 
Business Center Total 104 82 -22 
Business Association 441 359 -82 
Big Company 686 531 155 
Small & Medium Company and Association 110 98 -12 
Agriculture， Fishery， Forestry AssoCIation 139 133 -6 
Coop， Consumer， W omen Association 49 136 87 
Professional Social Insurance Ass 63 34 -29 
Other Professional 36 26 -10 
Medical AssoCIation 91 184 93 
Lawyer 44 78 34 
Teacher 143 82 -61 
Professional Total 377 404 27 
??????
Professor 1042 1080 38 
]ournalism 131 144 13 
Governmental Local Government 104 97 一7
Big 6 Local Govn't Ass. 28 30 2 
ex.Bureaucrat 147 129 18 
Total 
Corporation Public Association 119 143 34 
Research Center 275 224 一53
Foundation 65 208 143 
Public Corporation 296 234 --62 
Total 755 815 60 
Oth巴rs 151 124 -27 
Grand Total 4415 4268 -147 
* The number of m巴mb巴rsappointed due to their position are excluded from 
caIculation. 
Source: Shingikai Soran (Advisory Board Directory) 
1973， 198. caluculated by the author 
cuIture and social affairs. This proportion is lower than that of West 
(See table 3) However， Germany. The number itself is increasing. 
from the point of view of“osmotic" networks， labor representation at 
the semi-formal and informallevel is more important than that at the 
As a matter of fact， inthe 1970s labor succeeded in formal levels. ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
advisory non-statutory and sub-committees important entering 
boards where more substantial discussion occurs prior to consulta-
tion by the formal advisory board (Shinoda， 1989. pp.94-102). Rengo 
groups and its predecessors also doubled the number of direct consul-
In 1993 Rengo has 13 standing 
consultatior committees including those with the Ministry of Finance， 
tation systems with bureaucracies. 
Table 3 Labor Representation in the Advisory 
Board: A Comparison of Japan and West 
Germany in the 1980's 
Repres巴ntation
Proportion 。~ 0.09 
0.10 ~ 0.19 
0.20 ~ 0.29 
0.30 ~ 0.49 
0.50 ~ 
]apan West Germany 
# of 1/100 
Ad. Board 
36 0.57 
12 0.19 
5 0.08 
10 0.15 。0.00 
非of1/100 
Ad. Board 
48 0.36 
39 0.29 
26 0.20 
11 0.08 
5 0.04 
Japan West Germany 
Labor Market/Condition 
Income/Property 
Education 
Social Securitv 
Econ/Budget/lndus. Pol 
1、echnology/Research 
Environmental 
Energy 
Medical/Health 
Development/Housing 
Agriculture 
Social Problem 
Statistics 
Culture 
四 Tranportation/Tra伍c
:: Others 
七
_'-ノ、 Total 
非of 非of
ABs Memb 
7 5 
4 4 
14 2 
20 11 
40 14 
15 ワ
3 2 
7 4 
12 4 
20 4 
22 4 
4 
3 。
4 。
11 5 
28 2 
214 63 
% 
71.4 
100.0 
14.3 
55.0 
28.6 
13.:~ 
66.7 
54.1 
33.3 
20.0 
18.2 
00.0 
00.0 
00.0 
45.5 
7.1 
29.4 
非of # of 0/ 
ABs Memb. /0 
39 34 87.2 
6 3 50.0 
15 7 46.7 
14 10 71. 4 
12 5 41.7 
24 2 9.1 
14 5 35.7 
9 2 22.2 
27 5 18.5 
6 4 66.7 
23 7 30.4 
11 5 45.5 
18 1 61.1 
32 22 68.8 
18 5 27.8 
:3 6 18.2 
301 133 44‘2 
Source: Shinoda 1989 Note: Japan in 1986， West Germany 1981 
MITI and the Ministry of Health. In contrast to Sohyo， which mainly 
relied on the Ministry of Labor and political meetings with the Prime 
Minister which were mere rituals， Rengo and the group have many 
direct channels to in臼uencesubstantial policy making processes in 
many agencies and ministries. In fact， they have a daily contact with 
section chiefs in bureaucracies as well as other union leaders. 
In conclusion， Rengo， its core menbers and enterprise unions 
affiliated with them have networks within themselves， amongst them-
selves， with companies (employers)， with bureaucracies and with 
other actors. These networks overlap those in business， bureaucracy 
There not only top leaders are inclucled but and the party system. 
often more important intermediate levels (directors and section 
chiefs) are set by. An increasing number of formal， semi-formal and 
informal meetings are held， therefore we could describe them os駒
This kind of relationship and interaction is sharply different motic. 
This from that practised by SoAり10and in the public sector unions. 
will be shown more distinctively in examining the effect of the 
networks below. 
11. Effects of Rengo's Networks 
??????
Shared Perspectives 1. 
Once networks of labor unions begin to overlap those of other 
sectors， increasing interaction occurs among different actors and 
proportionally more information can be shared by them across 
These plural networks begin to fuse into one 
large network. Actors begin to consider their partners indispensable 
permeable boundaries. 
and legitimate because they have gradually shared perspectives (cf. 
Presthus， 1974). 
This can be observed from the results of three surveys. One 
international survey of employees conducted in 1984 shows that“85% 
of regular employees working for large companies manufacturing 
steel， automobiles or electric machines (65% of whom were blue 
collar workers) answered that their company's gains were more or 
less connected to their own." This proportion is significantly higher 
than those of the U.S.， U.K. and West Germany (Inagami， 1988， p.20). 
The situation is fundamentally the same for union leaders especially 
in Rengo's core members. The other surveys of industrial federation 
leaders in Rengo and Zenminroかo(1986， 1987， 1988， See Figure 3) 
show that they are more concerned about government policy on 
promotion of industry， tax reforms， countering business cydes than 
that on job security or improvement of labor conditions. In industrial 
policy they are more interested in future plans， capital exports and 
industry cavitation. Even the new Rengo chairperson Akira Yamagi-
shi said，“these days， Japanese employees are more likely to think as 
company managers than not." (cited in Katzenstein， 1988， p.288) 
On the question of shared perspectives， Rengo's organizational 
survey shows (1989) that more than half (56%) of the industrial 
四 federationsin Rengo are now conducting cooperative consultation 
毛 and more than 0間以third(38%) of them are engaged in some kind of 
J¥ :_; joint action with business associations. The new Rengo has begun 
joint action with peak business associations， such as Nikkeir四
(J apanese Employers Association) on the problem of company hous四
ing and with Keindanren (Federation of Economic Organizations) on 
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land price and other structural reform issues (Nikkei， 1990 3.9). 
Multi.Directional 8ehavior or Osmotic 8ehavior 2. 
which behaved basically as a political， In contrast to Sohyo 
mi1itant and class oriented movement and therefore developed access 
to a very limited number of actors like JSP， JCP， left wing social 
movements， the Ministry of Labor and a few top LDP elites， Rengo 
This is what 1 has developed access to as many actors as possible. 
call “osmotic behavior" here. 
The difference between the Rengo group and the Sohyo group is 
clear in table 4 which is based on a survey of interest groups in 1980.6 
In contrast to the Sohyo group， Rengo group unions generally do not 
In exercise veto and are more positive in poIicy making (Q42). 
contrast to the Sohyo group in al items， and more than the average 
interest group in Japan in most items， they are more oriented to 
budgetary politics (Q31)， rely less on mass mobilization (Q32)， main. 
tain more contact with LDP at the poIicy council (Seicho・Kai)(Q28)， 
meet more frequently with higher administrators (Q21)， exchange 
opinions， are supportive of and cooperate with bureaucracies， send 
members to advisory boards (Q12)， and are more favorable to the 
This tendency was confirmed by a recent government (Q33， Q55). ??????
The record of formal meetings of Rengo survey in Rengo (1989). 
federations affiliated to Rengo and Zemminrokyo (predecessor of 
Rengo) also confirms that they held meetings more in number with 
1n the survey 52 labor unions were divided into the Rengo group and 
出eおhyogroup based on their attitude toward the unification move. 
ment initiated by the major industrial federations in the private sector. 
6 
Characteristics of Rengo Group in Comparison with Sohyo Group and 
Other Interest Group Categories 
(い>)ctl!ll 
Table 4 
????
??
? ? ? 』
』?
? ??
。??。
?
?
???
? 〉
? ?
、 ，? ?
』??
?
?》 ? ? ? 。 』
?
? ?
? ?
? ?
?
? ? ?
??? ? ?。
??????〉?
????
??
。??
?
??
? ?
』。 ?
?
? ?
??
L噌
15 
E ω、
EEぷ
門戸←
~ >~当
官官S
J5B2 
?
?
???????
?
? ?
? ?? ?。。
?
????。
? ?
??
??。
? ?
? ? ?
?
』????? 』
? ? ?
??
????。???〉???
??
?
??
??
? ?
? ? ? 』 ? ?
?
? ?
?
?
? 。
?
? ? ? ? 。 ? ?
? ?
??
? 。 ? ?
?
???
?
? ?
?? ?
?
???
?
?
?
? ?
??。
?
? ?
? ?
?。
?
?? ? ? ? ?
?????
??
? ?
?
?
? ? ?
??。?
? ? ?
? ???
?
?
??。
?
? ?
? ? 。
???
?
?
??
? ? ?
?
?
??
?
??
? ? ?
? ?
?
?
? ?
? 】
?
?
??。??
? ? ? ?
?
?
??
??
? ? ?
? ? ?
? ? ?
?
? ? ?
??
?
??《????
?。?
? ?
? ? ? ?
??? ?
? ?
?
??
?
?
???』
?
? ?
??
』 。 、 ?
??
?
?
? ? ?
?
』』。?
?
〉?
? ?
?
74% 91 61 3.7 7.3 30% 6.0 4.7 95% 86 73 7.8 5.4 6.3 23 
70 宮7 53 2.8 7.0 17 6.4 5.6 80 80 50 7.8 5.0 6.2 30 
55 66 39 1.5 6‘8 24 13 6.4 5.5 95 76 75 8.0 5.6 5.9 88 
46 79 65 4.3 2.9 25 23 4.2 6今9 64 41 69 ~.~ 4.0 5.8 52 
80 93 40 2.7 7.5 20 33 7.2 4.7 87 86 67 8.3 6目2 7.2 15 
83 100 58 2.5 7.7 8.6 5.2 83 83 75 8.6 6.0 7予3 12 
67 67 56 7.9 7.0 22 22 7‘5 7.2 78 78 89 6.7 5.3 7.2 9 
32 63 37 4.1 3.9 11 16 3.6 6.7 42 21 53 3.4 3.5 6.1 19 
25 25 。 5.6 。 25 2.5 5.0 50 25 50 6.7 6.7 5.8 4 軍司..ー--_.蜘 ーー明...同『・..酔 ・ー‘ー -ー_-_ ..柑“圃噛 回司覗峰山僧白骨 制司ーーーーーー 叫・ 4 ・ー... ーー_----- ...・・...阿世 ----薗 岨司_---_ー -ー-_-ー噌・ ーー 回ー僻姐・. -・『ー .ー.輔占 咽_-------・ー -ー---
58 77 49 2.8 6.0 27 21 5.8 5.6 80 66 68 7.1 5.1 6.2 252 
58 89 81 3.1 3.1 46 39 5.0 6.4 85 56 85 6.4 4.4 5.9 26 
〔同盟4.4)
35 69 50 0.0 2.7 4 自 3.5 7.5 42 27 54 4.6 3.6 5.8 26 
Q42 Q31 Q22 Q32 Q25 Q28 Q21 Q20 Q20-3 Q12-1 Q12-2 Q12-3 Q33 Q55 Q45 
Agriculture 
Welfare 
Busine.s 
Labor 
Governmental 
Educatiotl 
Professional 
Citizeロ!Polit.
the Other 
Tota! (averaged) 
Sρhyo group 
Rengo group 
Interest Group Survey 1980， See Tsujinaka 1987， Muramatsu， Ito， Tsujinaka 1986ヨSource 
business and industry leaders， bureaucrats and LDP politicians than 
al the other labor unions and opposition parties together. (See figure 
4). Rengo leaders met with the former groups (bureaucrats， etc) 
forty-one times and with the latter (opposition parties) forty times 
and with others six times between February 1988 to January 1989. 
This is truly a drastic change from the situation in the Sohyo era of 
the 1950s and the 1960s. 
3. Achieving Hegemony in the Labor 
In terms of the number of a伍liationmembers from the private 
sector， Sohyo was no longer the national center after 1967 when it was 
surpassed by Domei and the first unification movement started. 
However the movement failed by 1973 and Sohyo survived until1989. 
But when Sohyo fel behind to the third place in number of private 
sector Rengo's core members were able to set up a Zenminroか0，the 
predecessor of Rengo in 1982. See figure 6. 
Sohyo was an oligarchy of centralized pubIic enterprise unions. In 
1989， three public sector unions in Sohyo (]ichiro， Zentei， Nikkyoso) 
had a budget of 45.5 billion yen in total. They supported 55 congress 
members and 923 local assembly members. This contrasts with 44 
private sector unions in Rengo with a budget of approx.1.7 billion yen 
supporting 40 congr田smembers and 1622 looal assembly members.芸
Sohyo was to dominate the labor movement very eficie凶 ybecause穴
of its monopoly (approx. 90%) and centralization in the pubIic sector 
which employs only 10% of the Japanese workforce. But how were 
the Rengo's core members able to overcome their weakness and 
overtake Sohyo? Once again it were the networks that mattered most 
Zenminrokyo 1984/10-1987/5 
Business 
f ederations 
5 
Labor nat i onal 
centers 
10 
Federations affiliated to Zenminrokyo 
??????
?
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? ???
?，???
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Li beral Democratic 
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Source: Tsujinaka 1987， Shinoda 1989b 
Fig. 4 Political Behavioral Pattern of Rengo 
Group: Zenminrokyo and Private lndustral 
Federations (the frequency of formaI meet-
ings with political actors) 
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to the Rengo's inftuence. 
Before the oil shock， Domei also appeared to have a chance to 
become a national center; but it failed in the end. This was because 
it aIso shared certain principles with Sohyo : centralization principle 
of industrial unions， identification with a single supporting politicaI 
party， being outside of the osmotic networks and being different from 
八 non-partisanor coalitional orientation of Rengo. 
_L. ノ、
lnnumerable networks， organizations and meetings appeared and 
disappeared in the history of Iabor unification. Ten major 
semi-formaI ones prior to Rengo are shown in Table 5， which shows 
those unions that became core and how the Rengo's core members 
The Rengo Group's Intra-sector Net-
works: A Containment Process of Sohyo 
Group Unions 
Table5 
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Made by the剖 thor(S田 Nihonrodo・削減問 1982，Ujihara ed. 1988). Source: 
involved other unions. It seems certain that around 1981， when Japan' 
s major administerative reform effort was taken place and Rincho 
began， the arrangement of unions which resulted in the formation of 
Rengo in 1987 had already been settled. The existence of many more 
informal networks of same ranking position leaders should be noted， 
(Yo・such鵠 Sh，包:njukai，Hachikt伽 :i，Fukunokaij Mukuno如i，etc. 
shimuna 1990， p.87). Most of these informal groups have been formed 
With the increase in their number， the soon after the oil.shocks. 
Finally， with the JSP frequency of their interaction also increased. 
defeat in the 1980 elections， Sohyo member unions were contained and 
lost their ablity to act independentIy. 
Sohyo & Rengo: A comparison 4. 
In retrospet， the following emerged as Sohyo 'smajor slogans: 
ma路 mobilizedSpring Wage 0釘ensive(Shunto)， peace and anti.war， 
These slogans and maintaining the Constitution (Goken) movement. 
were in line with its organizational structure as well as its ideological 
umons sector public and oligarchs Sohyo While orientation. 
benefitted from their organizational strength in the labor sector， none 
of public sector unions had the right to strike and even 3/4 of them 
In order to overcome this lacked the right to conclude contracts. 
weakness they had to emphasize public awareness through mass 
??????
They did this through Shunto and political campaign. mobilization. 
This was also done in keeping with their ing during elections. 
socialist ideals. 
In the same way Rengo's slogan Seisaku・seidoToso (struggle for 
policy and institutional reform) has made up for its lack of resources 
and has become appropriate to its focus on network development， 
cooperation and professionalism. Initially， the struggle of Reη~go 
appears to be less for gaining concrete goals and more for cultivating 
networks that will penetrate into the policy process. 
The new Rengo has allotted al conventional ideological functions 
to the residual clearing centers (Sohyo Center and Yuai Kaigi). This 
left it free to develop to being the center of osmotic networks; it 
entablished a think tank (Rengo Soken)， a union leader education 
center (Rengo Daigak.α) now under consideration and a fundation for 
international networking (Rengo Kokusai Rodo Zaidan). These 
succeeded in connecting heterogeneous elements to Rengo and 
facilitating its osmotic characteristic. 
Sohyo， having been substantially a national center for the public 
sector which ascribes to a socialist ideology， was strongly hostile to 
the enterprise unions arrangements that prevailed in the private 
sector. It fought to overcome the entire system leading to frequent 
hostility between the two sectors. But Rengo developed as an 
enlarged version of the enterprise unions and has attempted to func-
tion as a national center for them. N aturally， therfore it has been 
coping with the fragmented reality of ]apanese unions in order to 
become a national center. It is now the center of the networks of 
enterprise unions; this is not its weakness but its strength. 
Table 6) 
(See 0 
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Table 6 Sohyo and Reη!go : A Comparison 
Sohyo Rengo 
1 Monopoly degree 
1984 1989 
(A) Proportion in th巴organizedlabor 
4.43million 35.6% 7.98million 65.0% 
Private sector 
1.42mil. 15.7% 
Public sector 
3.01mil. 88.5% 
5.65mil. 59.3% 
2.33mil. 86.6% 
(B) Proportion in total employee 
12.0% 18.0% 
(C) Opposition groups in the labor sector 
ρο例目 (confrontational)2.2mil 
CJunぜお14(neutraI) 1.5mil 
S'hin雪anbelsu(neutral) .1mil 
Zenro陀n(confrontational) 
1.4mil 
Zenrokyo (confrontational) 
0.5mil 
(D) Opposition groups in the organization no opposition 
1、oit日urosokon1.4mil. 
(pro-communist) 
Tekko-roren O.3miI. etc. 
(IMF-]C group) 
2 Centralization degree 
(A) Bargaining power 
som巴whatstronger 
because of the networks 
inside and with oth巴rs
? ? ?
?
(B) Strik巴resource
Somewhat stronger 
esp. in public sector 
(C) Sta仔日 andlocal branch 
somewhat substantial depending on successful 
uni自cationbetween Sohyo 
branches and Domei branches 
in local branch 
(Chihり10，Chikuro 13(0) 
(530) 250 organizer 
(max/ 1966~73: :305) 
continued 
Rengo 
Seeking after the Social 
justice within the 
]apanese Constitution 
Sohyo 
3 Principles and means 
(A) Goal 
Democratic reforms 
and socialist society 
(Multiple network model) 
(slogan: rational & 
reasonable wage raise) 
Policy-Institutional 
Reform 
Policy-participation 
(B) Organizational ldeal 
Singular union model 
based on strong industrial 
federations 
(C) M回 nsand Slogans 
Spring Wage Offensive 
(slogan: largest wage raise) 
Political el巴ctioncampaign 
Mass mobilized joint struggle 
(slogan: maintain Constitution， 
and peace) 
broad networking with 
opposition parties and 
LDP (semi-non partisan) having 
orientation toward political 
realignment 
(B) Government and bureaucracies 
generally confrontational 
access point: limit巴dto 
Ministry of Labor 
budgeting proces芯.
scope and timing limited 
(C) Other 
active liaison with social move-
ment: peace， environmental， 
minority， and maintaining 
Constitution movement 
??????
generally cooperative 
access pOll1t: many， 
direct access to sections 
budgeting process : 
with broad scope being active 
4 Relationship with other actors 
(A) Political Party 
strong interlocking 
with JSP 
active liaison with business， 
social insurance， 
public association 
and volunteer group 
IV. 1964: the turning point toward the formation of osmotic 
networks and corporatism 
1 wish to draw your attention to broader historical changes which 
have occurred since the 1960s that gave impacts to other major 
actors; bureaucracies， the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)， big 
business， Japanese Socialist Party (JSP) as well as the labor unions. 
As per my hypothesis， the year 1964 can be the turning point in the 
shift to the new arrangement of osmotic networks from the earlier 
arrangement， which was characterized as an“Japan Incorporated" 
(Department of Commerce， 1972)， marked by a developmental or 
soft-authoritarian state， (Johnson 1982) or strong bureaucratic state 
labor without corporatism by characterized 1982) (Silberman， 
(Pempel， Tsunekawa， 1979) in a vertical society (Nakane， 1967， 78). 
Since the mid 1960s it is not only labor which has begun to change 
from a vertical hierarchical mode to more diagonal or horizontal 
The same is true of intra-company network mode (Shinoda， 1988). 
arrangements (Aoki， 1988， 89)， inter-company arrangement (Imai， 
1988) and bureaucratic arrangements for industrial policy (Oyama， 
As each element became more visible and al elements got 1989). 
institutionally crystallized， due to the crisis by the first oi! shock and 
subsequent confusion， the significance of 1964 cannot be belittled. 
??????
This is so because besides the emergence of each of these elements， 
the problem of 1964 is also directly related to the question of the one 
party dominance regime of LDP and to understanding the contradic-
tion abont the coexistence of corporatism in performance and plural-
ization in appearance in Japan. 
Kume (1989)， 1to (1989) and Tsujinaka (1986) have interpreted the 
change of labor union's attitudes as primarily referring to external 
conditions such as the oil shock and internal political developments 
such as LDP's structural vulnerability in the 1970s. However， they 
have not been able to locate the missing link that mediates external 
conditions and the subjective behavior of labor. The link is the 
development of osmotic networks; but these had begun as early as 
1964 with the first wave of liberalization of goods and capital fo 
foreign countries. 
Several symbolic events can be summarized as ; 
1. State and bureaucracy: Three important developments occurred. 
These were the dissolution of the Research Council for Revision of 
the Constitution (Kenpo) on July 3， 1964 and the Ad-hoc Committee 
for Administrative Reform (Rincho 1) on September 30， 1964 and the 
Diet's rejection of the Special Industry Promotion Act on June 16， 
1964. 
The counciI and committee mentioned above each presented 
reports but due to the cleavages between the minority and majority 
their reports were not subsequently put into effect. The failure of the 
counciI (Kenpo) implied that the ruling coalition had to give up its 
effort to recreate a form of semi-authoritarian centralization or 
hierarchic statism that included rearmament， a stronger police and :;: 
ノ、
the sovereignty of the emperor. 1n the same token the failure of 完
Administerative Reform Committee (Rincho)， suggested that a sort '-" 
of democratic or constitutionaI centralization which might be built 
around the strengthened prime minister should be broken down. The 
failure of the committee can be attributed to the existence of vested 
interests and sectionalism， particularly in the Ministry of Finance 
(Akagi-1nakawa， 1983)_ 
1n addition to these two general schemes， some particular law 
making power of the M1T1 were also rejected by the opposition and 
This too would have created greater hierarchic the ruling coalition 
1n 1964 a strong protectionist controJ and centralized bureaucracy. 
atmosphere that had been created by the threat of severe competition 
Neverthe駒that would follow the Iiberalization of trade and capital. 
less， the M1TI's proposed law， even though， itdisguised itself as 
simply an advice giving Iaw to rearrange industries， was seen as its 
having too strongly centralized fiat power. It was clear that the LDP 
and interest groups would not readiIy accept a bureaucracy-Ied 
corporatist system (Oyama， 1989)が 1nshort aI1 these actions showed 
a rejection of the tendency toward a stronger state and centraliza-
tion. 
Being denied the path to a strong state based on hierarchical 
centralization and controI under a statist ideology， the state bureau-
cracy turned toward the osmotic network system whereby more 
sophisticated and indirect means of control shouJd be developed and 
These included administrative guidance， advisory systematized 
councils， public corporations， business associations and personnel 
exchange in a variety of forms (Amakudari and Shukkou inc1uding 
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
Please see the explanation below). heki and H.αken. 
Bureaucracies have increasingly become networks where aI1 sub-
units (sections) keep considerable autonomy and have osmotic rela-
This creates “reciprocal consent" 
(SamueIs， 1988) based on shared information and and evelopment of 
tionships with other actors. 
a common perspective. 
As space is limited 1 wil1 only brietly touch on each of' these 
Amakudari refers to the practice begun after the war phenomena. 
whereby senior bureaucrats moved after retirement， toprivate com. 
panies and variety of quasi-public corporations. It has been checked 
by in formal and semi-formal ways: In 1963， the National Personnel 
Authority started inspecting the employment of Amakudari by com・
A Conference panies having trade relationships with bureaucracy. 
for Governmental Corporation Workers began in 1967 to examine 
The starting Amakudari employed in special public corporations. 
years， 1963 and 1967， indicate the emerging signi:ficance of Amakudari 
Other retired bureaucrats are also employed around the mid骨1960s.
by companies not directly related to ministries and a variety of public 
corporations such as special or recognized corporation， pub1ic foun. 
A substantial number of special public dation and associations. 
corporations (about one-third) were established in the 1960s and their 
features increasingly correspond to that of the private companies. 
The relationship with bureaucracy has also become diagonal if not 
horizontal (Tsujinaka， 1988). In other words Amakudari， which began 
as a vertical semi-controlling intermediary， has become more os・
motic. ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
Shukko (personnel transter) is taken place in both private and 
public sectors in many ways and from the point of view of networks 
By a cabinet it is a more important phenomena than Amakudari. 
decision taken on January 29， 1965， al elite bureaucrats are required 
to be transfered for more than two years to other bureaucracies 
This including local governments and special public corporations. 
aimed at overcoming sectionaIism among them and broadening their 
perspectives. Prompted by this decision the number and proportion 
of Shukko was doubled between 1968 and 1978 (See table 7-A). In the 
late 1980s it can be estimated that about 3000 bureaucrais are on Ioan 
to other ministries， 1000 to public corporations and 500 to local 
governments. (See Table 8) 
Shukko is also used as means by many private companies to 
develop cooperation between its employees and the bureaucracies. It 
is di伍cultto estimate the precise number but roughly 120 seem to be 
working as temporary researchers and 60 as temporary officials 
(Mainichi， 1989， 12.10). 
In addition to networking through personnel exchange， bureau-
cracies have tried to utilize many statutory advisory boards， non-
statutory advisory boards and joint study projects in their a節liated
foundations. These have provided good places to communicate and 
to develop osmotic networks with the other actors. 
In 1965， the number of statutory advisory boards reached its peak 
at 272. After this year， proliferation was controlled in accord with 
the Rincho report. Nevertheless， an increasing number of sub-
committees under formal boards and non-statutory boards have 
taken the place of formal boards. The arrangement of bureaucratic 
= networks by ministries is shown in table 8 & 9. 
五 2. Big Business: Business leaders who were opposed to MITI.led-
ムー崎
ハ protectionismin 1964， did instead triy to regroup along two Iines: 
vertical sub-contractor groups and horizontal corporate groups. Both 
took on clear shape in the mid 1960s as business attempted to respond 
to international liberalization namely trade liberalization begun in 
Shukko (personnel transfer) Networks in 
the Bureaucracies 
Table 8 
??
??
?
〈
?
??。??
??
? ? ?
?
?? ?
?
? ? 。 ? ? ? ?
?
? ?
? ?
? ? ? ? ?? ?
?
??
1 
3 
<l u 
〉‘ロ~CIj 
00>:: 
2CL; 
;Eo 
5 
l 
，、
a 
?
?
??
』? ? ?
Transfer to 
Cabinet Secretariat 
Cabinet L巴gislationBureau 
National Personnel Authority 
National Defence Council 
(6) 
。???? ?
??
? ? ?
?
5 
Prime Minister's 0伍ce
Fair Trade Commission 
National Police Agency 
Environmental Dispute Cord. Comm. 
Imperial Household Agency (3) 
6 
(1) 
5 
2 
???
????
?
????
?
?
? ?
?
?
っ
? ?
????
?
??
???
??
?
?
?
?
??
? 、
?
????
??
??
Managemt & Coordina. Agency 
Hokkaido Development Agency 
Defence Agency 
Defence Facilities Adm. Agcy 
Econmic Planning Agency 
Science & Technology Agency 
Environment Agency 
Okinawa Development Agency 
National Land Ageny 
??????
1 
?
?
?
，
?
?
?
4 
55 
1 
6 
24 
1 
2 
2 
11 
Ministry of 
Justice 
foreign Affairs 
Finance 
National Tax Adm. Agncy 
Education 
Health & Welfare 
Social Insurance Agncy 
I 
(2) 
1 
1 
1 
4 
1 
1 
Agric. For巴try& Fisheri己S
Food Agency 
Forestry Agency 
Fisheries Agency 
MITI 
Agency of Natnl Resource 
Pal:ent 0伍ce
Small & Medium Enterprise Agency 
M. of Transport 
LRC for Seafares 
Maritime Safety Agency 
Meteorological Agency 
M. of Posts 7 Telecommuni 
M. of Labor 
M. of COI1struction 
M. of Hom日Affairs
231 
3 4 14 1 
Made by the authoτbased on each Ministries' Directories 1988 
Congress Office 
Others 
Source: 
1961， and had its peak in 1964. Consequently， participation of ]apan 
as an IMF article eight country which meant liberalization of capital 
The fundamental feature to be noted was in effect. (Tsuda， 1977). 
here is that both groupings are not centralized hierarchies but ftexible 
(osmoticl networks. Corporate groups can take the following forms: 
the association of presidents; considerable mutual stockholding on a 
????????
long term basis; financing of member corporations by the core banks 
and information exchange through general trading firms (Imai， 1988 
p.14). lmai suggested that corporate groups，“can be considered as 
an intermediate institution that exists between the market and the 
organization" (p. 18). These are primarily osmotic networks because 
Shukko (1oan and tranfer of personnel) in 
the Bureaucracies and in the Private Firms 
Table 7 
The proportion of personnel transfer in the 
public sector's annual recruitment 
Year 1958 1968 ]978 1987 
7~A 
1495 
9.9% 
1649 
19.6% 
2962 
1025 
8‘6% 
1304 
596 
4.9% 
1398 
11.5% 21.4% 
2563 
478 
3.7% 
1177 
9.1% 
Personnel recrui ted 
(returned or loaned) 
from special service， 
local governments and 
special public corporations 
Personnels loaned or 
returned among 
bur巴aucracies
Retired personnels 
employed by special 
services， local govern. 
ments and special public 
corporations 
14.7% 17.1% 
Jinji.in (Personnel Authority)， R<'，戸orton Reauitment 01 
Public se rvaηお(]apanesc)
Source: 
The proportion of SfIUkko-doing-firms and the 
proportion of loaningied personnel in the total 
employee 
Doing Shukko 
7ぃB
? ? ?
?
???
% of Shukko personnel N 
loaning perso即時l
6.5% 
loaned tranfered 
21.9% 7.9% 
410 
1748 
231 
loaning (yes! 
327 firms (8:1.7%) 
loaned/trasfered (yes) 
1473 firms (85.8%) 
loaning transfering 
180 62 
("18.0) (26.9) 
loaned tranfered 
134 81 
(58.1 %) (35.1 %) 
loaned 
].1.1% 
Big firm穆
.Related 
l1rm傘*
lVIiddle 
firmキ車場
8500 1.2% general本. approx. 
* 1986 10，本*1988 2 Koyo.so.ken， Report 110.85 (1989， 3)
* * * ]98810.11， Sangyo.koyo Center， Report 
* * * * 198710， Ministry of Labor， .Report 
Source: 
Bureaucratic Networks (Amakudari， Shuk-
ko， Advisory Boards) 
Table 9 
MITI 
Construction 
Tranport 
Post & Telec. 
Finance 
Agriculture 
Health & Welf. 
Labor 
Education 
]ustice 
Foreign 
Home 
Econ. Planning 
Science & Tech 
Hokkaido devel. 
Police 
Total 
(including others) 
* Ex-bureaucrats (senior)， who had some contractual relationships with 
the business area， employed by private companies with permission of 
the Personnel Athority. See Jinji-in， Amakudari Report， 1985 & 86 
Ex-bureaucrats employed in pulic corporations by 1985 
See Seirok.汐0，Ama初da門 WhitePaper， 1986 
Counted only major loa口ing(more than three). See Seikan jinji Roku 
(Toyokeizai Shinpo sha， 1986) 
Counted by ]ichiro. See ]ichiro Local AmakuぬriRψort 1989 
Shukko from private companies as temporary researcher etc 
非in1985. * * * * * * * * #estimatedbythe author (1984 1.]-859.15) 
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20.3 
29.2 
27.9 
100.0 
86.5 
21.1 
4.0 
8.3 
1.1 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
15.5 
83.3 
0.0 
? ? ?
?
? ? ? ? ?
?。? ?
??〉
?』
?
???
? ?
? ? ?
?????
???
?
?
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?
?
?
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?? ???。?
Ministries 
7 
298 214 558 486 (95) 426 130 320 
** 
*** & ** 
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? ? ? ? ?
? ?
they accompany Shukko， joint ventures， joint study groups and other 
forms of informal communication. Even the vertical groupings with 
sub-contractors are flexible because they include many autonomous 
companies which keep more than two lines of relations. Shukko plays 
an important role between parent companies (6.5% of whose total 
employees are transfered to related companies) and related com-
panies (29.4% of whose total employees are on loan from parent 
Within companies the QC (quality control) companies) in the 1988.7 
circle movement began in 1963 and spread rapidly through the busi-
ness community (Inagami， 1988). It was influenced by more general 
Productivity Movement that started earlier in 1955. The QC process 
has been closely inter-related with the creation of osmotic networks 
with enterprise unions. 
Between 1957 and 1973， about 7000 or more business associations 
were established thus tripled their total number (Tsujinaka， 1988 p. 
This trend clearly demonstrates networking not only within the 19). 
business community but accross the bureaucracies as well. 
Sohyo-JSP bloc and LDP : 3. 
While the bureaucracies and business were shifting away from 
hierarchical control toward osmotic networks， Sohyo misunderstood 
these developments as an attempt against centralization by state 
monopoly capitalism. On the surface Sohyo appeared in control of its 
established role as the representative of ]apanese labor as shown by ?????
?
? ?
the meeting between Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda and Sohyo chair-
person Kaoru Ota to settle the 1964 Shunto Wage 0妊ensive(Apri116， 
The aggregate number of Shukko (loaned) emp10yees was estimated to 
be about 268 thousand in 1988， which is approx. 1.2% of the tota1 
emp10yees in companies which have more than 30 emp10yees (Japan 
Productivity Center， Katsuyo Rodo Tokei， 1989). A1so see tab1e 7-B. 
7 
1964) and by the active role played by Ota in the first Rincho 
However， at the annual meeting of Sohyo in 1964 Committee. 
Zendentsu (whose chair became the first chair of Rengo) strongly 
criticized the Sohyo leadership. This year became the critical turning 
point of Sohyo. 
In addition to the formation of two rival national federations 
Domei (November 12) and IMF-JC (May 16) in 1964， Ota's apparent 
triumph at the meeting with Ikeda itself paradoxically signalled 
In the meeting's settlement， Shunto was officially Sohyo 'sdecay. 
accepted and its network among public， private and intermediate 
This meant that those sectors was completed and institutionalized. 
actors who were in strategic positions within the network would be 
critical factors in the running of the system. Subsequently， IMF-JC 
followed by the Rengo group would take the initiative in the labor 
movement.8 Based on a misunderstanding of reality， Sohyo emphas-
ized unified industrial struggle based on shop level activity and local 
joint struggle to compensate for the organizational weakness of 
However， at the enterprise unions (Okochi ed. 1966， p.p 412-416). 
shop levellabor， labor union activity had been surrounded by the QC 
movement and despite its slogan which emphasized organization of 
heavy and chemical industries， organizers were in fact more often 
occupied by the election campaign.9 
Rengo groups proportion in the three period pattem setters in 品開to.
S恥mto:
8 
? ? ? ? ?
?
? ?
1956-63…_.-・H ・..0/8
1964-74…・H ・H ・..6/11
1975-84…..・H ・..10/10
The major reason for !:3ohyo's failure was its inability to recognize 
the trend towards osmotic networks-corporatism_ This in turn resteり
on its socialist， public-sector-oriented perspective_ For the precisely 
same reasons the JSP went against the emerging osmotic trend. In 
December 1964 the JSP adopted as its general principle， named “The 
way to sociaIism in J apan" (revised in 1966) cIearly defining itseIf as 
a socialist party. These principles remained functional until N ovem-
ber 1985. The sociaIists could not understand the new trend， particu-
larly the significance of Iked.α's line of “new right" which in fact 
abolished the ideal of a strong hierarchical state 
PubIic resistance to the strong hierarchical and authoritarian path 
taken by the LDP in the late 1950s was the reason for the increasing 
support of JSP (Ishikawa and Hirose， 1989). Despite the shifting 
policies of LDP， the JSP strengthened its protest activities (Otake， 
1990). The structural reform faction and its leadership by Saburo 
Eda (Secretary-General of J.S.P. 1960.3-1962_11， 68.10-70.11) which 
seemed to have the potential to develop those kinds of osmotic 
networks that might have helped the JSP， were broken down first in 
November 1962.“Eda Vision" was rejected in the convention and 
again in 1966 Eda was defeated twice in the January and December 
elections for the chair-person. In these elections， renewed support 
9 The number of Sohyo's organizers (professional activist in charge of 
organizing un organized workers) is as follows : 
1956 ・…...・H ・'90organizers 
1959……...・H ・..226 organizers 
1966……...・H ・.305 organizers 
1973……...・H ・.250organizers 
ムF、
。
From then the lack of osmotic net-was expressed for socialism. 
works with other substantial networks in Japan and as its corollary， 
the lack of an extensive information network， both of them resulted 
in the JSP's loss of the ability to govern and support from the “new 
This was cIearly shown as middle mass" (Murakami， Yasusuke). 
early as the JSP's defeat in the 1969 general election. 
In contrast， the LDP learning from its unpopular policy and 
strategy of the late 1950s and 1960 tried to change as shown by their 
Income Doubling Plan in 1960; the moderate labor policy which 
crystallized in the Labor Charter of LDP in 1966 (by the effort of the 
Minister of Labor， Hirohide Ishide， 1960.7-1961.7， 64.7-65.6)， by the 
LDP Modernizing Plan pushed forward by Takeo Miki in October 
1963 and by “A Vision of Conservative Party" by Hirohide Ishida 
Through aIl these published in the Ch仰 koronin J anuary 1963. 
endeavors the LDP succeeded in changing its stand "towards the 
bureaucracies and business associations and their own networks. As 
a result of the changes in the late 1960s， numerous changes took place 
in the party including the rise of zoku， variety of policy leagues， 
campaign support associations and innumerable formal， semi-formal 
and informal meeting groups. 
Conclusion 
?????
?
??
All elements of osmotic networks had been created by the time of 
first oil-shock and the effects of osmotic corporatism initiated from 
the micro.enterprise level gradually extending to the meso・industry
level. Therefore after severe crises caused by the oil-shock (actuaIly 
a complex situation coincided with the Nixon shocks， the oil shock， 
Prime Minister Tanaka's scandal and LDP's confusion) these net-
works have been knitted toge出ermore closely and easily through a 
economlc and political important Many of osmosis. process 
exchanges were made through this process such as “] apanese type of 
Income Policy in 1975"; enlarged policy participation by labor since 
1976; a series of Depressed Industries Areas and Employment laws 
1977-88 and the famous second Rincho administrative reforms (1981 
守 83，1983-86). 
This proc田sand exchange can be seen as corporatism of osmotic 
networks that involves pluralization of actors and strategic coopera・
However， since tion between the LDP and Re招:go'score members. 
1986， as a result of the introduction of high technology， the emerging 
and the international liberalization under “information society" 
increasing a自uencein Japan networks themselves have begun to 
deepen osmosis (Imai， 1988) and have brought changes in political 
Political events such as JSP's new principles (1985) arrangements. 
and LDP's triumph (1986)， the failure in tax reforms， and the forma-
tion of the Rengo (1987) prepared a political realignment. 
Therefore Just before the termination of the cold war and the 
drastic surge of Yen appreciation， the ]apanese osmotic corporatism 
was completed by involving the final major participant， Rengo. ? ? ? ? ? ?
?
??
In conclusion， 1 would like to consider the implications of the 
This network osmotic model for understanding ]apanese politics. 
model has both similarities and di狂erenceswith the four models 
The vertical bureaucracy model is stil very 
popular， particularly with foreign observers as well as journalists as 
it concurs with the European example of state integration and 
mentioned earlier. 
performance. This model was helpful in explaining the efficiency of 
bureaucratic networks in J apan. But it is inadequate in explaining 
the significance of other networks and their interrelationships and the 
existence of osmotic behavior of diagonal if not horizontal relation-
ships. The pluralists' analysis was helpful in comprehending the 
pluralization of political actors， including business interests and LDP' 
s networks. However， the pluralists appear to neglect the field of 
labor and therefore have not been able to explain Japan's outstanding 
economic and social performance and the failure of the JSP. The 
cultural model was successful in explaining the broader historical 
factors that precede the formation of osmotic networks. But this is 
unable to explain the concrete mechanisms of osmosis that are at 
work in present. Subsequently， this model is inadequate in explaining 
the shift from“vertical" to more“加rizontal"relationships that took 
place after the war. The corporatist model has exclusively focused 
on centralized peak organizations and turned to neglect of networks 
that exist in absence of centralized organizations in Japan. Net-
works are becoming even more important in Japanese society at 
present because of its transformation to an information society. 
We once again come back to my first question: why are/were 
Rωzgo and the Rengo group strong? As 1 have described， the answer 
Is to be found in the existence of osmotic networks inside and outside 
of the Rengo group. The answer should be elaborated along three 
R d i r e c t i o n s : a t t h e m i c r o l e vel，entr pri se1u紅帥
information mediators wi江tl恒1託incorporative en凶1北te町rp戸rise出sleadin沼gtωothe 
development 0ぱfmore dif紅tuseand 紅駐ex討ib削lec∞orpor悶atesy戸st臼ems町， a抗tthe 
me白solevel Rengo'、snetworks work wel1 because they simulate those 
of other actors'; at the macro level they work well in a developing 
The information generated due to Rengo's 
networks becomes very crucial in stabilizing the system itself. 
information society. 
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